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ABSTRACT 
 
In 1986, Congress passed the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, which established 
a no-fault compensation system to provide money to people who are injured by vaccines. The 
major  impetus  behind  this  Act  was  the  soaring  cost  of  tort  litigation  and  damages  awards 
imposed on vaccine manufacturers, which was causing many manufacturers to stop producing 
vaccines altogether. The resulting vaccine shortages threatened the public health of the country. 
In recent years, manufacturers of prescription drugs have paid large damages awards and legal 
fees that are akin to those costs borne by vaccine manufacturers in the 1970s and early 1980s. 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers can be liable for billions of dollars if patients who take a drug 
suffer an unexpected adverse event that was not discovered during clinical trials. The uncertainty 
about  the  extent  of  liability  a  manufacturer  may  face  for  a  particular  drug  is  causing  many 
manufacturers  to  remove  beneficial  drugs  from  the  market  or  to  forego  drug  development 
altogether. As a result, Congress should establish a no-fault compensation system to replace 
failure-to-warn  claims  against  prescription  drug  manufacturers.  Such  a  scheme  would 
significantly reduce the incredible costs that the current drug product liability system imposes on 
drug manufacturers. At the same time, patients who take a prescription drug and suffer a serious 
injury that was not foreseen by the drug manufacturer or the FDA will be compensated, so long 
as  they  can  prove  that  the  drug  was  the  cause  of  their  injury.  The  National  Vaccine  Injury 
Compensation Program is an excellent model that Congress can adapt to meet the needs of 
participants in the market for prescription drugs.  
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I. Introduction 
  In  1986,  Congress  passed  the  National  Childhood  Vaccine  Injury  Act.
1  The  Act 
established  a  no-fault  compensation  system  –  the  National  Vaccine  Injury  Compensation 
Program – that provides money to people who are injured by vaccines. Before the program was 
                                                 
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 et. seq. 2 
 
implemented, an individual who was injured by a vaccine could sue the vaccine’s manufacturer 
under the theory that the vaccine was defectively designed or that the manufacturer had failed to 
warn the public about the risks associated with vaccination. In the 1970s and 1980s, vaccine 
manufacturers paid billions of dollars in compensatory and punitive damages awards and legal 
fees.  The  high  costs  of  tort  litigation  imposed  on  vaccine  manufacturers  caused  many 
manufacturers to stop producing vaccines altogether, leading to dangerous vaccine shortages that 
threatened the public health of the country. 
  To limit soaring legal costs and ensure that the United States receives a sufficient supply 
of vaccines, Congress established a no-fault compensation system that is administered by the 
Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Justice, and the Court of Federal 
Claims. Vaccine manufacturers contribute to a trust fund by paying a tax on each vaccine that is 
administered. If a person receives a vaccine that is covered by the program and is injured within 
a certain amount of time after the vaccine is administered – or can prove that the injury was 
caused by the vaccine – that person is eligible to receive money from the trust fund to cover 
medical expenses and other damages. A special master at the Court of Federal Claims evaluates 
petitions for compensation and makes a decision about the amount of money to be awarded; the 
claimant can appeal this decision to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and then to the 
Supreme Court. Since the program started awarding money in 1988, $2,281,706,685.32 has been 
disbursed to petitioners and $89,108,361.76 has been paid to cover attorney’s fees and other 
legal costs.
2 
  In recent years, manufacturers of prescription drugs have paid soaring damages awards 
and legal fees that are akin to those costs borne by vaccine manufacturers before the National 
                                                 
2 NATIONAL VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION PROGRAM: DATA & STATISTICS, http://www.hrsa.gov/vaccinecomp- 
ensation/data.html (last updated May 1, 2012). 3 
 
Vaccine  Injury  Compensation  Program  was  established.  Patients  who  suffer  an  unexpected 
adverse  event  after  taking  a  drug  can  sue  the  drug’s  manufacturer  on  the  theory  that  the 
manufacturer failed to provide an adequate warning about possible side effects of the drug. Even 
when a drug has been approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), a manufacturer 
can be liable for billions of dollars if patients suffer injuries that were not discovered during 
clinical  trials.  This  was  the  case  with  the  fen-phen  “diet  drug,”  which  ended  up  costing 
pharmaceutical manufacturer Wyeth $16 billion over ten years of litigation.
3 The uncertainty 
about  the  extent  of  liability  a  manufacturer  will  face  for  a  particular  drug  is  causing  many 
manufacturers to forego drug development altogether or to remove beneficial drugs from the 
market. 
  Several  scholars  have  proposed  replacing  failure-to-warn  claims  with  a  no-fault 
compensation system modeled after the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program. Like 
the vaccine program, this system would function by using a tax on prescription drugs to award 
money to patients who suffer unexpected adverse events after taking a drug. This new scheme 
would help ensure that drug manufacturers are not deterred from investing in new and innovative 
drugs for fear of the crippling legal costs that may result under the current tort system. 
  This  paper  argues  that  Congress  should  establish  a  no-fault  compensation  system  to 
replace failure-to-warn claims against prescription drug manufacturers. In Part II, it evaluates the 
current system of drug product liability, which comprises state-law tort claims for manufacturing 
defects, design defects, and inadequate warnings of potential side effects. Part III describes the 
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and evaluates some of the program’s successes 
and  failures  since  its  inception  in  1986.  Part  IV  proposes  the  Prescription  Drug  Injury 
                                                 
3 Anita Bernstein, Enhancing Drug Effectiveness and Efficacy Through Personal Injury Litigation, 15 J.L. & POL'Y 
1051, 1054 (2007). 4 
 
Compensation  Program,  modeled  after  the  vaccine  program,  which  would  replace  state-law 
failure-to-warn claims against prescription drug manufacturers. Part V concludes. 
II. Evaluating the Current Drug Product Liability System 
A.  Drug Product Liability: Causes of Action 
There are three causes of action that someone who is injured by a prescription drug can 
bring against the drug’s manufacturer. First, the injured plaintiff can claim that the drug had a 
manufacturing defect.
4 If the plaintiff can prove this claim, the drug manufacturer is held strictly 
liable for the defect.
5 Second, the plaintiff can argue that the drug is defective in design.
6 Both 
manufacturing defect and design defect claims are relatively rare and uncontroversial.
7 The bulk 
of drug product liability litigation involves the third possible claim against drug manufacturers: 
the manufacturer failed to provide an adequate warning about foreseeable risks associated with 
the drug.
8 When a plaintiff brings a failure-to-warn lawsuit against a drug manufacturer, there are 
three major issues that must be resolved by the court: 1) whether the drug actually caused the 
plaintiff’s injury; 2) whether the manufacturer had sufficient knowledge about the risk of that 
injury such that it had a duty to warn; and 3) whether the warnings provided were adequate to 
satisfy the manufacturer’s duty.
9 
 
                                                 
4 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2. A product “contains a manufacturing defect when the product 
departs from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised in the preparation and marketing of the 
product.” Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2. A product “is defective in design when the foreseeable risks 
of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design 
by the seller or other distributor . . . and the omission of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably 
safe.” Id. 
7 Michael D. Green, Statutory Compliance and Tort Liability: Examining the Strongest Case, 30 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 461, 470, 472 (1997). 
8 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2. A product “is defective because of inadequate instructions or 
warnings when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the 
provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller or other distributor . . . and the omission of the 
instructions or warnings rendered the product not reasonably safe.” Id. 
9 Green, supra note 7, at 473. 5 
 
B.  Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Drug Product Liability System 
The drug product liability system should only be replaced with a no-fault compensation 
scheme if the system’s costs outweigh its benefits. At the outset of this analysis, it is important to 
note the difficulty of quantifying the costs and benefits of the current system.
10 Individual drug 
manufacturers are usually unwilling to disclose the details of their legal expenses for fear that 
publicizing this information would encourage new suits or increase future settlement demands.
11 
In  addition,  many  jury  awards  are  reduced  on  appeal,  and  settlements  between  drug 
manufacturers  and  injured  plaintiffs  are  frequently  sealed.
12  Therefore,  it  is  very  difficult  to 
determine how much money pharmaceutical companies spend to defend drug product liability 
suits. On the benefits side, it is impossible to calculate the extent to which drugs are safer and 
more effective as a result of the tort system. It is also difficult to determine how many patients 
who are injured by prescription drugs actually receive compensation from the drug manufacturer. 
Even so, it is worth considering and attempting to weigh the costs and benefits of the drug 
product liability system to assess the strength of the case for reform. 
1.  Direct Costs: Litigation Expenses and Damages Awards 
  Drug product liability lawsuits – and failure-to-warn claims in particular – have cost 
some  pharmaceutical  manufacturers  billions  of  dollars  and  many  years  of  litigating  and 
negotiating settlements in courts all over the country. For example, Eli Lilly’s drug Zyprexa, 
used to treat schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, was the target of many lawsuits brought by 
plaintiffs claiming that they developed diabetes or other blood sugar disorders after taking the 
                                                 
10 Gregory C. Jackson, Pharmaceutical Product Liability May Be Hazardous to Your Health: A No-Fault Alternative 
to Concurrent Regulation, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 199, 229 (1992). 
11 Id. at 229 & n.205. 
12 Id. 6 
 
drug.
13 By 2007, Eli Lilly had agreed to pay $1.2 billion to settle claims with 28,500 people who 
were injured by the drug.
14 Vioxx, Merck’s wildly popular arthritis drug, was withdrawn from 
the U.S. market after patients taking the drug began experiencing higher rates of heart attack and 
stroke.
15 In 2008, Merck reached a $4.85 billion settlement agreement to compensate injured 
patients.
16 The most extreme example of direct costs of drug product liability litigation is the diet 
drug  phen-fen,  which  kept  its  manufacturer  Wyeth  in  court  for  over  a  decade  after  patients 
suffered cardiac injuries that had not been identified as a risk of taking the drug for an extended 
period of time.
17 By the time most of the claims had been resolved, Wyeth had spent more than 
$16 billion.
18 
2.  Indirect Costs: Uncertainty and Overdeterrence 
  In addition to direct costs such as money and time spent litigating that pharmaceutical 
manufacturers face under the current system of drug product liability, there are many indirect 
costs that are more difficult to quantify. The most significant indirect cost is uncertainty; it is 
frequently difficult or impossible for a drug manufacturer to predict how much money it will 
have to spend on tort litigation for a particular drug. For some drugs, litigation costs may turn out 
to be very low, but for others that have unexpected side effects, damages awards and settlement 
payments might be astronomical. Even if a pharmaceutical company attempts to calculate ex ante 
the financial burden of hypothetical failure-to-warn claims for a specific drug, various aspects of 
the tort liability system make it nearly impossible to come up with an accurate estimate. For 
example, jury awards in tort cases vary immensely because “jurors exercise substantial leeway in 
                                                 
13 Bernstein, supra note 3, at 1054. 
14 Alex Berenson, Lilly Settles with 18,000 Over Zyprexa, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 5, 2007, available at 
 http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9f00e5db1430f936a35752c0a9619c8b63. 
15 Bernstein, supra note 3, at 1054. 
16 VIOXX SETTLEMENT UPDATE, http://www.officialvioxxsettlement.com/ (last visited May 2, 2012). 
17 Bernstein, supra note 3, at 1054. 
18 Id. 7 
 
determining damages, which in turn permits variation in outcomes of similar cases.”
19 Not only 
are most jurors ill-equipped to calculate damages properly, nearly all of them are unqualified to 
resolve complex scientific issues of causation.
20 A juror’s task is made all the more difficult by 
the fact that she has to rely on the testimonies of competing expert witnesses who frequently 
present evidence and opinions of dubious scientific validity.
21 
When the uncertainty about the extent of liability for a particular drug is compounded 
with uncertainty about whether a drug in the R&D pipeline will successfully treat a disease, 
several undesirable consequences may result. First, pharmaceutical manufacturers might decide 
to forego drug development altogether.
22 The chilling effect of uncertainty therefore causes the 
benefits of new and effective drugs to be lost to society.
23 One significant example of this was 
Oculinum, an experimental drug undergoing clinical trials in the mid-1980s. The drug showed 
incredible promise as a treatment for blepharospasm, a condition characterized by eyelid muscle 
spasms  that  clamp  the  eyelids  closed  for  several  minutes.
24  In  1984,  however,  Oculinum’s 
manufacturer decided to halt clinical testing because the company could not obtain affordable 
liability insurance for the drug.
25  
More recently, there have been striking examples of drug shortages and the consequences 
of  such  shortages  for  patients.  In  2003,  a  director  of  pharmacy  services  at  the  New  Jersey 
Hospital Association explained that hospitals frequently face shortages of injectable anesthetics, 
                                                 
19 Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for “Trial by Formula,” 90 TEX. L. REV. 571, 584 (2012). 
20 Jackson, supra note 10, at 232-33. 
21 Id. 
22 Green, supra note 7, at 467. 
23 See Louis Lasagna, The Chilling Effect of Product Liability on New Drug Development, in THE LIABILITY MAZE: 
THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION, 334 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991). 
24 Note, A Question of Competence: The Judicial Role in the Regulation of Pharmaceuticals, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
773, 774 (1990). 
25 Id. According to a Time article published in 1984, “nationwide testing has been halted because the manufacturer 
says he is no longer able to find an insurance company that will sell him affordable liability insurance. . . . [I]nsurers 
are afraid they will be hit with huge damage suits if any untoward side effects occur.” Eye Misery: Insurance Loss 
Halts Drug Test, TIME, Oct. 27, 1986, at 71. 8 
 
painkillers, antibiotics, and steroids.
26 He complained that “at any given time, it seems there are 
about  four  dozen  drug  items  that  are  near-impossible  to  get.”
27  The  consequences  of  drug 
shortages were dire for three patients being treated for bacterial meningitis in San Francisco; they 
died after a local pharmacy prepared a contaminated drug mixture as a substitute for a steroid 
that was temporarily unavailable.
28 Medical professionals have also expressed concern about 
significant drug shortages in specific markets, such as the market for drugs used to treat illness 
and disease in children.
29 There are many factors that deter pharmaceutical manufacturers from 
producing drugs to treat children, including the level of liability exposure that might result if a 
drug unexpectedly caused children to suffer serious adverse events.
30 
A second consequence of uncertainty and overdeterrence is that manufacturers who do 
develop new drugs are more likely to test those drugs more rigorously over a longer period of 
time, thereby delaying the availability of the drug to patients.
31 A third consequence is that 
manufacturers are likely to increase the cost of a prescription drug in order to create a financial 
buffer in case the drug ends up costing the manufacturer billions of dollars in tort damages.
32 The 
increasing cost of liability insurance may also incentivize drug manufacturers to raise the price of 
prescription drugs.
33  
                                                 
26  Paula  Jacobi,  Pharmaceutical  Tort  Liability:  A  Justifiable  Nemesis  to  Drug  Innovation  and  Access?,  38  J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 987, 992 (2005). 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30  Id.  Other factors that deter drug manufacturers from producing drugs for children are the small size of the 
pediatric market (since children are a relatively healthy sector of the population) and public sensitivity associated 
with using children as test subjects in clinical trials. Id.  
31 Green, supra note 7, at 467. 
32 Jackson, supra note 10, at 205. 
33 One example in the context of vaccines is demonstrated by the increasing price of the diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis 
(DPT) vaccine, which cost 11¢ in 1982 and $11.40 in 1986. Eight dollars of the money received for each dose in 
1986 went to the manufacturer’s liability insurance. Id. 9 
 
A fourth consequence of uncertainty  is that beneficial drugs are withdrawn from the 
market.
34 One prominent example of this is the drug Bendectin, which was manufactured by 
Merrell Dow and approved by the FDA to treat morning sickness in pregnant women.
35 In the 
early 1980s, Merrell Dow had to defend over 2,100 product liability lawsuits after allegations 
surfaced  that  Bendectin  caused  birth  defects  in  children  born  to  mothers  taking  the  drug.
36 
Although  the  FDA  conducted  an  investigation  of  Bendectin’s  safety,  it  failed  to  reveal  any 
evidence that the drug was dangerous to unborn children.
37 Even the scientific community could 
find no causal connection between Bendectin use and fetal deformity.
38 Yet Merrell Dow had to 
defend  numerous  lawsuits  targeting  the  drug,  and  the  manufacturer  agreed  to  a  class  action 
settlement of $120 million. Ultimately, Merrill Dow decided to withdraw Bendectin from the 
market, and the drug’s therapeutic advantages were no longer available to pregnant women.
39  
In conjunction, these four consequences of uncertainty perpetrated by the current tort 
liability system lead to shortages in supplies and suppliers of pharmaceuticals.
40 Fears about 
shortages in vaccine supply and suppliers were a major impetus behind the National Childhood 
Vaccine Injury Act.
41 
3.  Costs Imposed by Recent Federal Preemption Jurisprudence 
  Recent court decisions dealing with the issue of federal preemption of state tort claims 
only  strengthen  the  case  for  a  no-fault  scheme  to  compensate  patients  who  are  injured  by 
prescription drugs. Most significantly, in 2009, the Supreme Court decided Wyeth v. Levine.
42 
                                                 
34 Green, supra note 7, at 467. 
35 Jacobi, supra note 26, at 990. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 991. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40Green, supra note 7, at 467. 
41 See infra Part III.A. 
42 555 U.S. 555 (2009). 10 
 
Plaintiff Levine was injured by a drug that was administered intravenously, and she brought suit 
against the drug’s manufacturer for failing to provide adequate warnings about the significant 
risks  of  intravenous  administration.
43  Pharmaceutical  manufacturer  Wyeth,  however,  had 
complied with all FDA labeling requirements for the drug.
44 Wyeth argued that Levine’s state-
law claims should be preempted because it would be impossible for the drug manufacturer to 
comply  with  both  the  state-law  duties  underlying  those  claims  and  federal  labeling  duties 
imposed by the FDA.
45 The Supreme Court rejected this argument and held that Levine’s failure-
to-warn claim was not preempted by federal law.
46 
  The Supreme Court’s holding in Wyeth solidifies the significant financial burden that a 
drug manufacturer faces if patients suffer an adverse event that is not adequately described on 
the drug’s label. After this decision, even if a drug manufacturer complies with all FDA labeling 
requirements, the manufacturer must still comply with every state-law requirement, or it might 
be on the hook for billions of dollars. This financial burden could have a significant chilling 
effect on drug manufacturers’ willingness to develop and sell innovative new drugs. If state-law 
failure-to-warn claims were replaced with a no-fault compensation system, drug manufacturers 
would not bear the burden of paying massive compensatory and punitive damages for adverse 
events that the FDA does not require to be described on the drug’s label. 
  Two years later, in 2011, the Supreme Court again faced the issue of federal preemption 
of state tort claims. In PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, plaintiffs had taken the generic version of a drug 
for  several  years  and  subsequently  developed  tardive  dyskinesia.
47  They  sued  the  generic 
manufacturer  of  the  drug  in  state  court  for  failing  to  provide  adequate  warning  labels.  The 
                                                 
43 Id. at 559-60. 
44 Id. at 562. 
45 Id. at 563. 
46 Id. at 581. 
47 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011). 11 
 
manufacturer  argued  that  federal  statutes  and  FDA  regulations  should  preempt the  state  tort 
claims because they require the generic drug to have the same safety and efficacy labeling as the 
brand-name drug.
48 The Supreme Court agreed with the manufacturer, holding that federal law 
preempts  state  laws  imposing  the  duty  to  change  a  drug’s  label  upon  generic  drug 
manufacturers.
49 
  The outcome of the Mensing case provides further evidence that the current system of 
drug product liability should be reformed. After this decision, if a patient takes the brand-name 
form of a drug, that patient may bring state-law tort claims against the manufacturer for failing to 
provide adequate warnings about a particular adverse event. But if a patient takes the generic 
form of that drug, he or she cannot sue the drug’s manufacturer in state court. The patient who 
takes  the  generic  form  of  the  drug  cannot  sue  the  manufacturer  of  the  branded  drug  either, 
because the element of causation is missing; the branded drug did not cause the patient’s injuries. 
Patients who took the generic drug are therefore left without a significant avenue of recovery that 
is  available  to  patients  who  took  the  brand-name  version  of  the  same  drug.  A  no-fault 
compensation scheme that preempts failure-to-warn claims against both generic and branded 
manufacturers would eliminate this disparity and provide relief to all patients who are injured by 
different versions of the same drug. 
4.  Benefits 
  It is apparent that the current system of drug product liability imposes significant costs on 
society. But there are two major ways that the system might benefit society.
50 First, and most 
importantly, the system might enhance drug safety and effectiveness beyond that provided by 
                                                 
48 Id. at 2573. 
49 Id. at 2581. 
50 Jackson, supra note 10, at 229. 12 
 
federal regulation and oversight.
51 Second, the system might efficiently spread the risk of drug-
induced injuries by compensating those who are injured by prescription drugs.
52  
  Several scholars have argued that the tort system enhances drug safety over that achieved 
through  FDA  regulation  alone.  This  is  because  a  significant  amount  of  critical  information 
emerges about a drug’s safety after it has been approved by the FDA and made available to the 
public.
53 There are several reasons why it is difficult for a drug manufacturer to uncover all of a 
drug’s side effects during clinical trials.
54 For one, it is hard for the manufacturer to anticipate all 
of the side effects that a drug might cause and design a clinical trial to detect those effects.
55 In 
addition, if an adverse event is rare or only affects a certain subset of the population, it may not 
emerge in clinical trials that are conducted on a limited number of subjects.
56 As a result, many 
prescription drugs reach the market without warnings about adverse events that eventually begin 
to  affect  patients.  The  threat  of  drug  product  liability  lawsuits  therefore  incentivizes 
pharmaceutical manufacturers to add additional warnings to drug labels as soon as they become 
aware  of  new  side  effects.
57  Even  if  the  FDA  resists  a  drug  manufacturer’s  suggested  label 
change, the manufacturer often takes an aggressive stance to ensure that the change is made; it is 
in  the  company’s  best  interest  to  disseminate  information  about  new  risks  that  emerge  as 
promptly as possible.
58 
  The tort system might also play a role in incentivizing pharmaceutical manufacturers to 
participate in the FDA’s adverse event reporting system. The FDA requires drug manufacturers 
                                                 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Michael D. Green, Safety as an Element of Pharmaceutical Quality: The Respective Roles of Regulation and Tort 
Law, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 163, 179 (1998). 
54 Id. at 180. 
55 Id. (quoting Michael D. Green, Statutory Compliance and Tort Liability: Examining the Strongest Case, 30 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 461, 496 (1997)). 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 13 
 
to report serious Adverse Drug Reactions (ADRs) within fifteen days of the event being reported 
to the manufacturer.
59 Drug companies may fail to submit ADRs to the FDA out of a concern 
that profitable drugs will be pulled from the market.
60 However, the Fourth Circuit has held in a 
failure-to-warn  action  that  a  pharmaceutical  manufacturer  can  be  required  to  pay  punitive 
damages for withholding ADRs from the FDA.
61 According to one commentator, “the threat of 
punitive  damages  from  thousands  of  litigants  forces  drug  manufacturers  to  consider  these 
litigation costs when deciding whether to investigate and report ADRs.”
62 The more ADRs that 
are reported by drug companies, the more quickly the FDA will be able to identify harmful drugs 
and either warn consumers or remove the drugs from the market. 
  The tort system may also benefit society by efficiently spreading the risk of injuries 
caused by prescription drugs, products that have been deemed avoidably unsafe. According to 
this argument, the damages paid to plaintiffs who have been injured by prescription drugs are 
part of the cost of doing business for pharmaceutical manufacturers. Manufacturers pass on the 
costs imposed by the tort system to the public in the form of increased drug prices. If the system 
functions as it should, manufacturers are profitable and patients who suffer unexpected adverse 
events after taking a prescription drug are compensated for their injuries. 
5.  Weighing the Costs and Benefits 
  While  some  commentators  believe  it  is  a  benefit  that  the  tort  system  incentivizes 
pharmaceutical manufacturers to update drug labels as the company acquires new information 
about  unexpected  adverse  events,  others  view  this  incentive  as  a  cost  of  the  system.  Some 
                                                 
59 21 C.F.R. § 314.80 (2005). The FDA defines an ADR as “serious” if it results in “[d]eath, a life-threatening 
adverse  drug  experience,  inpatient  hospitalization  or  prolongation  of  existing  hospitalization,  a  persistent  or 
significant disability/incapacity, or a congenital anomaly/birth defect.” Id. 
60 Anne Erikson Haffner, The Increasing Necessity of the Tort System in Effective Drug Regulation in a Changing 
Regulatory Landscape, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 365, 392 (2006). 
61 Benedi v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 66 F.3d 1378, 1389 (4th Cir. 1995). 
62 Haffner, supra note 60, at 394. 14 
 
scholars who have argued for tort reform express concern that drug manufacturers flooding the 
FDA with requests for label changes – in hopes of avoiding failure-to-warn lawsuits – may 
discourage patients from using beneficial medical products.
63 In addition, tort liability claims 
against manufacturers place immense pressure on the FDA to re-label drugs or withdraw them 
from the market on the basis of anecdotal evidence.
64 While some drugs will be made safer by 
the drug product liability system, other drugs will be removed from the market before scientists 
have a chance to determine whether or not the drug is actually dangerous. 
Although one of the purported benefits of the tort system is that it efficiently spreads the 
risk  of  dangerous  drug  products,  there  is  evidence  that  the  “vast  majority  of  drug-induced 
injuries go uncompensated as a result of the rigors of the tort system.”
65 While some plaintiffs 
win  “jackpot”  awards,  other  plaintiffs  whose  claims  are  equally  legitimate  go  without 
compensation entirely.
66 There are also many barriers that make it difficult for injured patients to 
enter the tort system in the first place. Someone who has been injured by a drug first has to 
recognize the causal relationship between the injury and the drug.
67 Then, the injured individual 
has  to  identify  his  legal  privileges,  meaning  his  right  to  sue  the  drug’s  manufacturer  to  be 
compensated for the injury.
68 Finally, the individual has to find competent counsel to execute the 
lawsuit.
69 The tort system is not achieving its goal of efficient risk-spreading if consumers are 
paying exorbitant prices for drugs but are not being compensated when they get injured by those 
drugs. 
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Finally,  it  is  important  to  consider  the  possibility  of  designing  a  different  system  to 
compensate injuries caused by prescription drugs that eliminates some of the costs of the tort 
system  while  retaining  many  of  the  benefits.  The  National  Vaccine  Injury  Compensation 
Program attempts to strike a balance between compensating people who have been injured by a 
vaccine and incentivizing vaccine manufacturers to supply safe and effective products. Using the 
vaccine program as a model, Congress can design a no-fault compensation scheme that strikes 
this balance in the realm of prescription drugs. 
III.  The  National  Childhood  Vaccine  Injury  Act  and  Other  No-Fault  Compensation 
Schemes 
 
A.  Why did Congress Pass the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act? 
  Vaccination has been an important aspect of public health management in the United 
States since the beginning of the 19th century. In 1905, the Supreme Court decided Jacobson v. 
Massachusetts and upheld the authority of states to enforce compulsory vaccination laws.
70 By 
the time Jacobson was decided, many states already required children to be vaccinated before 
they  entered  public  school.  Today,  immunizations  against  diphtheria,  measles,  rubella,  and 
poliomyelitis are required for public school attendance in all states.
71 Most states also require 
children to be vaccinated against tetanus, pertussis, and mumps.
72  
  Although it is rare for vaccines to cause serious injury or death, the sheer number of 
vaccines administered every year yield many children – and occasionally adults – who suffer 
complications as a result of vaccination.
73 During the 1970s and 1980s, an increasing number of 
injured people filed lawsuits against vaccine manufacturers, claiming that vaccines had been 
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negligently manufactured or that vaccines had not been accompanied with adequate warnings 
about  the  risk  of  injury  or  death.
74  Many  of  these  suits  were  incited  by  media  hype  about 
“scientific  evidence”  linking  vaccines  and  serious  injuries,  such  as  the  alleged  connection 
between the pertussis vaccine and permanent neurological damage.
75 Between 1980 and 1986 
alone,  plaintiffs  filed  more  than  $3.5  billion  worth  of  damage  claims  against  vaccine 
manufacturers.
76  As  litigation  expenses  and  damages  awards  increased,  many  vaccine 
manufacturers increased prices or ceased producing vaccines altogether.
77 In 1985, the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reported that U.S. stockpiles of some vaccines were 
below safe levels.
78 At that point, only two companies produced the DPT vaccine, and only one 
company manufactured the vaccine for polio.
79  
  Starting  in  the  1970s,  the  American  Academy  of  Pediatrics  (AAP)  –  an  advocacy 
organization  dedicated  to  the  health  and  well-being  of  children  and  adolescents  –  took  the 
position that tort litigation was a threat to pediatric immunization.
80 One of the seminal cases the 
AAP cited as an example of this threat was Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co.
81 The plaintiff in 
this case alleged that he had been injured by the Sabin polio vaccine, but he claimed that he 
would not have been injured if his daughter – from whom he contacted polio – had received the 
Salk  version  of  the  vaccine  instead.
82  The  Salk  vaccine  consisted  of  an  injected  dose  of 
inactivated virus, while the Sabin vaccine was a preparation of attenuated virus administered 
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orally.
83 At the time, most public and private health organizations preferred the Sabin vaccine 
because it was easier to administer and there was evidence suggesting that it conferred longer-
lasting immunity.
84 In addition, the defendant manufacturer was making the Sabin vaccine at the 
government’s  request.
85  Nonetheless,  the  Kansas  jury  awarded  the  plaintiff  $10  million  in 
compensatory  damages  and  ordered  the  vaccine  manufacturer  to  pay  $8  million  in  punitive 
damages.
86  The  verdict  was  upheld  by  an  intermediate  appellate  court  before  finally  being 
overturned by the Kansas Supreme Court.
87 Although all damages were eventually set aside, the 
manufacturer of the Sabin polio vaccine spent several years and millions of dollars defending the 
suit. In addition, the plaintiff was never compensated for his injuries that in all likelihood were 
caused by the Sabin vaccine. This case made it clear to many that the current situation was 
detrimental to both vaccine manufacturers and to those who were injured by vaccines. 
  Calls for reform began before the final resolution of the Johnson case. Appearing as an 
amicus in a Fifth Circuit case decided in 1974, the AAP argued that warnings about the adverse 
effects of immunization serve no useful purpose once epidemiologists have mandated universal 
vaccination.
88 Writing for the Fifth Circuit in that case, Judge John Minor Wisdom suggested 
that losses from unavoidable injuries caused by vaccines should be borne by the manufacturer as 
a  cost  of  doing  business  and  passed  on  to  the  public  in  the  form  of  price  increases.
89  The 
following year, Dr. Richard Krugman made the same proposal in the pediatric literature, and he 
recommended the establishment of a “no-fault coverage” system for vaccines.
90  
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Finally, in 1985, Senator Paula Hawkins (R-FL) and Representative Henry Waxman (D-
CA) introduced the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act.
91 The Act was intended to address 
two overriding concerns that Congress had about United States vaccination programs: 1) the 
instability  of  vaccine  supplies  due  to  manufacturers’  fears  about  tort  liability,  and  2)  the 
inadequate  and  inconsistent  nature  of  existing  state  tort  remedies  for  individuals  injured  by 
mandatory vaccination.
92 Congress passed the Act in 1986, and it has compensated individuals 
for vaccine-related injury or death since 1988.
93 
B.  The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program
94 
The Vaccine Injury Compensation Program is managed by the Health Resources and 
Services Administration, an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services. The 
Department of Justice and the Court of Federal Claims also play important roles in administering 
the program. The program is funded by a $0.75 tax on each dose of taxable vaccine that is sold; 
vaccines that are considered “taxable” are clearly defined in the Internal Revenue Code.
95 The 
money that is collected from these taxes is stored in the Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust 
Fund.
96  Since  the  program  first  started  compensating  injured  claimants  in  1988, 
$2,281,706,685.32 has been disbursed to petitioners and $89,108,361.76 has been paid to cover 
attorney’s fees and other legal costs.
97  
  If a person – usually a child – receives a vaccine and subsequently suffers injury or death, 
that person or a representative may be able to file a claim to receive money from the National 
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Vaccine Injury Compensation Program. As a threshold requirement to file a claim, the effects of 
the injury from the vaccine must have either lasted for more than six months after the vaccine 
was administered, resulted in a hospital stay and surgery, or resulted in death. If the claimant 
suffered an injury, he or she must file a claim within three years of the first symptom of the 
injury. If the claimant died, a representative must file a claim within two years of the death or 
within  four  years  of  the  first  symptom  of  the  vaccine-related  injury  from  which  the  death 
occurred.  
  After a claim is filed, an official at the Health Resources and Services Administration 
reviews  the  medical  information  in  the  claim.  This  review  is  then  sent  to  a  lawyer  at  the 
Department of Justice who reviews the legal aspects of the claim and writes a report. At this 
point, the file is transferred to a special master at the Court of Federal Claims. Special masters 
are lawyers that have two primary functions: case management and decision-making.
98 As a case 
manager, the special master oversees the collection of evidence and sets a time frame for its 
submission.
99 There is no formal discovery as a matter of right; the special master determines the 
format for taking evidence and hearing arguments based on the circumstances of each case and 
after consultation with the parties. As a decision-maker, the special master ultimately weighs the 
evidence in rendering a final, enforceable decision about whether the claim will be paid, and if 
so, how much money will be awarded.
100 If the special master decides to pay the claim, the 
petitioner  must  decide  to  either  accept  or  reject  the  special  master’s  decision.  If  either  the 
petitioner  or  the  Department  of  Health  and  Human  Services  is  unsatisfied  with  the  special 
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master’s resolution of the claim, either party may appeal to a judge of the Court of Federal 
Claims, then to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and finally to the Supreme Court. 
  In  order  to  receive  an  award  from  the  Vaccine  Injury  Compensation  Trust  Fund,  a 
petitioner must prove one of three things. First, the petitioner can prove that the first symptom of 
the injury occurred within the time period listed on the Vaccine Injury Table. The Vaccine Injury 
Table lists the vaccines that are covered by the compensation program, the injuries associated 
with each vaccine, and the maximum time period allowed between vaccine administration and 
the first symptom of the injury. Second, when an injury is not listed on the Table but is believed 
to have been caused by a vaccine that is covered by the program, the petitioner must use medical 
records or expert testimony to prove that the vaccine actually caused the injury. Finally, the 
petitioner has the option to prove that a vaccine caused an existing illness to get worse, meaning 
that  the  vaccine  “significantly  aggravated”  a  preexisting  condition.  If  the  petitioner  is  not 
claiming an injury covered by the Vaccine Injury Table, the special master must determine that 
the injury or aggravated condition did not result from any other possible causes. Although most 
petitioners choose the first alternative and claim injuries that are covered by the Table, about 
twenty-eight percent of the claims that the program receives concern “off-Table” injuries.
101 
Only  thirteen  percent  of  such  petitioners,  who  have  the  burden  of  proving  that  the  vaccine 
actually  caused  the  injury,  receive  any  compensation  from  the  program.  In  addition, 
compensation  awards  are  nearly  three  times  lower  for  petitioners  that  claim  “off-Table” 
injuries.
102 
  If a special master or a court decides to award the petitioner money from the Vaccine 
Injury Compensation Trust Fund, the petitioner is entitled to receive several different types of 
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compensation. If the petitioner or the person on whose behalf the petition was filed was injured 
by a vaccine, the injured individual is entitled to recover a reasonable amount of money for past 
and  future  nonreimburseable  medical,  custodial  care,  and  rehabilitation  costs  and  related 
expenses. The petitioner may also receive up to $250,000 for actual and projected pain and 
suffering, compensation for lost earnings, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and other legal costs. If 
the person on whose behalf the petition was filed was killed by a vaccine, the petitioner is 
entitled to receive up to $250,000 as a death benefit for the estate of the deceased, as well as 
reasonable attorneys’ fees and other costs. 
  There are several other aspects of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program 
that are important to its function as a no-fault compensation scheme. First, a person who has 
been injured by a vaccine must exhaust all remedies available under the program before filing a 
civil lawsuit against the vaccine manufacturer. Second, eligibility for the National Vaccine Injury 
Compensation Program is not affected by the standard of care under which the vaccine was 
administered. For example, an injured person can still file a claim under the program if the 
vaccine’s administrator was negligent or if the vaccine was administered for an “off-label” use. 
Third, the program relies on the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS) to monitor 
vaccines for possible side effects. VAERS is a national vaccine safety surveillance program that 
is co-sponsored by the FDA and the CDC.
103 Anyone can file a VAERS report, including health 
care providers, manufacturers, and vaccine recipients. More than 30,000 VAERS reports are 
filed annually, with 10-15 percent of those reports classified as serious.
104 
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C.  Evaluating the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program 
1.  Successes and Failures 
  In the more than 25 years since the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act was passed, 
many scholars have analyzed the extent to which the Act has achieved its purposes. In some 
respects, the vaccine compensation program has been a success. During the first ten years after 
the  program  was  implemented,  early  childhood  immunization  rates  improved  and  wholesale 
vaccine  prices  decreased.
105  Between  1990  and  1999,  no  commercial  vaccine  manufacturer 
ceased  production,  and  there  were  no  serious  vaccine  shortages  in  the  United  States.
106  In 
addition, large vaccine injury awards in state courts completely disappeared.
107 According to one 
commentator writing just before the turn of the century, “[t]he pharmaceutical industry has been 
vigorous  in  developing  vaccines  against  diseases  for  which  no  vaccines  exist,  in  creating 
combination vaccines, and in reengineering existing vaccines using biotechnology. . . . Since the 
inception of the program, measureable improvements have occurred in both vaccine access and 
utilization for U.S. children.”
108 
  Despite  the  early  successes  of  the  vaccine  compensation  program,  some  critics  have 
argued that the Act has failed to adequately facilitate petitioners’ recovery for vaccine-related 
injuries.
109 In support of this contention is the fact that more than two-thirds of claims filed under 
the Act are ultimately dismissed.
110 Injured individuals who are denied compensation under the 
Act generally remain uncompensated,
111 especially after the Supreme Court decided last year 
that  the  Act  completely  preempts  state-law  design  defect  claims  against  vaccine 
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manufacturers.
112 Critics of the Act have also taken issue with the Vaccine Injury Table and the 
heightened causation requirement for petitioners who have suffered “off-Table” injuries. For 
example, a petitioner may be able to demonstrate that she suffered an injury listed on the Table, 
but she may not be able to prove that the injury occurred within the exact time period required by 
the Table.
113 Without this proof, the petitioner has an “off-Table” injury and must establish 
causation by demonstrating: 1) a medical theory causally connecting the vaccination and the 
injury; 2) a logical sequence of cause and effect showing that the vaccination was the reason for 
the injury; and 3) a showing of a proximate temporal relationship between vaccination and the 
injury.
114  
2.  Proposals to Improve the Program 
  The process by which a petitioner demonstrates and a special master decides whether a 
vaccine caused the petitioner’s injury is one of the most controversial issues surrounding the 
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program. Some critics have argued that the standard of 
proof for establishing causation is too strict and that the program would be more successful if the 
standard were relaxed.
115 Betsy J. Grey, a professor at the Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law 
at  Arizona  State  University,  has  argued  that  the  strictness  of  the  causation  standard  should 
depend on the primary objective of the compensation program.
116 If the primary objective of the 
program is to “encourage widespread vaccination of the population by ensuring that vaccines are 
not incorrectly blamed for causing injury,” the causation standard should be more stringent, so 
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that only injuries actually caused by vaccines will be compensated.
117 If the primary objective of 
the  program  is  to  “ensure  adequate  vaccine  supplies  by  minimizing  liability  against 
manufacturers  and  administrators,”  the  causation  standard  should  be  more  relaxed,  so  that 
individuals injured by vaccines are compensated without having to resort to the tort system.
118 
Advocating the primacy of the latter objective, Professor Grey has argued that the concept of 
“causation” in the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program be replaced with the concept 
of “association.”
119 She proposes that the risk of scientific uncertainty be shifted away from the 
petitioner to a greater extent than is currently found in the common law system; the program – 
not the petitioner – should shoulder most of the risk that the petitioner’s injury was not actually 
caused by a vaccine.
120 Under this new concept of “association,” a petitioner would only have to 
prove the theoretical capacity of the vaccine to cause her particular type of injury.
121 
  In  contrast  to  Professor  Grey’s  proposal,  at  least  one  critic  has  suggested  that  the 
procedures  for  proving  causation  under  the  National  Vaccine  Injury  Compensation  Program 
should be more rigorous, to ensure that compensation decisions are based on reliable scientific 
evidence.  The  special  masters  at  the  Court  of  Federal  Claims  have  a  significant  amount  of 
freedom to admit and weigh evidence, and the master’s final decision will only be overturned if 
it is arbitrary and capricious.
122 When Congress passed the National Childhood Vaccine Injury 
Act, it provided very little guidance to the special masters besides charging the Court of Federal 
Claims with promulgating “flexible and informal standards of admissibility of evidence.”
123 The 
court responded to this charge by creating the Vaccine Rules, which specifically state that special 
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masters “will not be bound by common law or statutory rules of evidence.”
124 Even the Federal 
Circuit  has  recognized  that  “[c]ausation  in  fact  under  the  Vaccine  Act  is  .  .  .  based  on  the 
circumstances  of  the  particular  case,  having  no  hard  and  fast  per  se  scientific  or  medical 
rules.”
125  In  order  to  ensure  that  special  masters  have  the  power  to  exclude  evidence  and 
testimony  from  their  courtrooms  and  base  their  decisions  on  reliable  scientific  information, 
Congress or the Supreme Court could declare that special masters are bound by the evidentiary 
framework set forth in Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
126 This framework would 
allow  special  masters  to  exclude  evidence  or  testimony  that  is  irrelevant,  unreliable  or 
scientifically invalid.
127 
  These proposals for reforming the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program are 
relevant to policymakers considering a similar no-fault compensation scheme for prescription 
drugs. Understanding the successes and failures of the vaccine program will enable Congress to 
design a system for drugs that duplicates the successful aspects of the program while avoiding 
some of the problems it has faced. 
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D.  International Examples of No-Fault Systems to Compensate Drug-Related Injury 
and Death 
 
  If the United States establishes a no-fault compensation system for prescription drugs, it 
will not be the first country to do so. Several other countries had implemented no-fault schemes 
to compensate drug-related injury and death before Congress passed the National Childhood 
Vaccine Injury Act in 1986.
128  
1.  Germany 
West  Germany  implemented  a  no-fault  compensation  system  after  the  thalidomide 
disaster  of  the  early  1960s.
129  The  German  system,  established  in  1976,  was  intended  to 
compensate personal injury and death resulting from defective drugs, but it also compensates 
injuries  resulting  from  non-negligent  manufacturing  defects  and  failures  to  warn.
130  An 
individual will be compensated if that individual has been injured by a prescription drug “whose 
harmful effects in the course of its prescribed use objectively exceeded acceptable limits in the 
light of medical scientific knowledge.”
131 Unlike petitioners under the National Vaccine Injury 
Compensation Program, a petitioner under the German program forfeits all protection by using a 
drug  in  a  way  that  does  not  conform  to  the  manufacturer’s  instructions.
132  In  addition,  the 
petitioner is accountable for any part of his injury that he may have caused, in accordance with 
the common law principle of comparative negligence.
133 
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2.  Sweden 
  Another no-fault compensation scheme for prescription drugs was established in Sweden 
in  1978.
134  The  Swedish  Pharmaceutical  Insurance  was  the  result  of  a  voluntary  agreement 
between  the  pharmaceutical  industry  and  a  consortium  of  insurance  companies.
135  Like  the 
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, the system is funded entirely by taxes paid by 
pharmaceutical companies.
136 If a patient takes a drug and subsequently suffers a significant 
disability – measured by the extent of bodily injury and/or the amount of time the patient spent 
away from work – she fills out a form with the aid of her physician and submits it to her 
insurance  company.
137  The  form  and  all  of  the  patient’s  pertinent  medical  records  are  then 
reviewed by the insurer’s medical assessor and physician advisors, who determine whether there 
is a “preponderant probability” that the patient’s injury was caused by the drug she took.
138 If the 
patient disagrees with the insurance company’s decision, the case is referred to the Drug Injury 
Committee,  which  investigates  and  reports  its  findings  with  respect  to  the  patient’s  right  to 
receive  compensation.
139  Any  disputes  that  persist  are  resolved  through  arbitration.
140  If  the 
injured  patient  ultimately  accepts  compensation  from  the  program,  she  subrogates  all  other 
remedies to the insurance company.
141 
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IV. Establishing a No-Fault Compensation System for Prescription Drugs 
A.  Can policymakers rely on the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program as a 
model? 
 
In order to use the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program as a model for a no-
fault compensation system for prescription drugs, it is important to consider the similarities and 
differences between vaccines and drugs and compare and contrast the markets for each product. 
One  of  the  most  significant  differences  between  vaccines  and  drugs  is  that  vaccination  is 
mandatory, but consuming a drug is a matter of individual choice.
142 A major impetus behind the 
National  Childhood  Vaccine  Injury  Act  was  Congress’s  belief  that  people  should  be 
compensated if they are injured by a procedure that the government requires them to undergo. 
This rationale does not apply to prescription drugs because a sick or injured individual always 
has a choice about whether or not to take a drug. Even when this “choice” is really a choice 
between life and death, the government never requires a patient to take a drug the same way it 
requires people to get vaccinated. 
Another difference between vaccines and drugs is the subset of the population to which 
these products are administered. Vaccines are given to healthy individuals, particularly children, 
who generally do not suffer from pre-existing conditions and constitute the healthiest age group 
in the United States. In contrast, prescription drugs are taken by individuals who are sick or 
injured, meaning that their health is substantially compromised before they are treated. This 
makes  it  much  more  difficult  to  establish  a  causal  link  between  a  prescription  drug  and  an 
adverse event than it is to establish causation between a vaccine and a particular injury.
143 The 
heightened difficulty of determining causation when a patient claims to have been injured by a 
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prescription drug, as compared to when a patient claims a vaccine-related injury, must be taken 
into account when designing a no-fault compensation system for drugs. 
  Although  there  are  several  significant  differences  between  vaccines  and  drugs,  the 
similarities between the two products suggest that the National Vaccine Injury Compensation 
Program could be relied on as a model for a no-fault compensation system to replace certain drug 
product liability causes of action. Drugs, like vaccines, have enormous public health value.
144 In 
addition, the FDA is extensively involved in regulating the testing, development, and marketing 
of both drugs and vaccines.
145 Finally, experts have recognized that it is impossible to attain 
absolute safety for drugs and vaccines, but these unavoidably unsafe products are absolutely 
necessary  in  modern  society.
146  Patients  benefit  from  a  robust  drug  market  characterized  by 
innovation and price competition, so the government should ensure that drug companies are not 
withdrawing from the market to avoid skyrocketing litigation costs and damages awards. Over 
the years, there have been numerous examples of prescription drug shortages that parallel the 
vaccine shortages of the 1980s. For example, concerns about liability for drug-related injuries 
have contributed to drug shortages and stifled innovation in the market for contraceptives;
147 no 
fundamentally  new  contraceptive  drugs  have  been  introduced  in  the  United  States  since  the 
1960s.
148  While  the  differences  between  drugs  and  vaccines  indicate  that  a  no-fault 
compensation scheme for drugs would have to include some elements that are drug-specific, the 
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similarities  between  the  products  suggest  that  the  National  Vaccine  Injury  Compensation 
Program is a good model for a new system that will compensate drug-related injuries. 
B.  The Prescription Drug Injury Compensation Program 
A no-fault scheme to compensate individuals injured by prescription drugs would have 
four main goals.
149 First, the scheme would compensate individuals for injuries resulting from 
serious, unforeseen adverse events in a fair, timely and transparent manner. Second, the scheme 
would  protect  pharmaceutical  manufacturers  from  skyrocketing  litigation  costs  and  damages 
awards by preempting state-law failure-to-warn claims. Third, by providing manufacturers with a 
greater amount of certainty about the post-market cost of producing a prescription drug, the 
scheme  would  promote  greater  innovation  in  U.S.  drug  markets.  Fourth,  by  enabling  more 
rigorous monitoring of adverse events caused by prescription drugs, the scheme would yield 
increased information that officials can use to improve the safety and effectiveness of drugs in 
our country.  
1.  Program Overview 
The Prescription Drug Injury Compensation Program (“the Program”) would only apply 
to certain drugs that are sold in the United States. While the Program would not cover over-the-
counter medications, it would apply to prescription drugs produced by both brand-name and 
generic manufacturers.
150 The FDA would be charged with developing and maintaining a list of 
drugs covered by the Program. It would be left for the FDA to decide whether the Program 
should be extended to cover “lifestyle drugs” – an imprecise category of medications that treat 
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non-life-threatening or superficial conditions such as baldness, impotence, and acne.
151 While the 
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program compensates petitioners for almost any injury – 
as long as the petitioner can prove that the injury was caused by a vaccine – the Prescription 
Drug  Injury  Compensation  Program  would  be  more  limited  in  scope.  Unless  a  drug  has  a 
significant  public  health  benefit,  such  as  stopping  the  spread  of  a  dangerous  communicable 
disease, the Program would not compensate individuals for any side effects they suffer after 
taking the drug if the FDA knew about those side effects and adequately described them on the 
drug’s  label.
152  Therefore,  the  Program  would  only  compensate  petitioners  who  suffer 
unforeseen adverse events. 
In order for an individual to receive compensation from the Program, he would have to 
prove  an  actual  injury  –  there  would  be  no  compensation  for  medical  monitoring,  as  is 
sometimes available from the tort system. The injury must have been sustained after taking a 
covered  drug  for  a  disease  or  condition  for  which  the  drug  was  approved  by  the  FDA;  the 
petitioner would not recover from the Program if his injury resulted from off-label use of a drug. 
If an injured individual has taken a drug that is covered by the Program, any state-law failure-to-
warn claims that he could bring against the drug’s manufacturer would be expressly preempted. 
A petitioner would only be able to file a lawsuit in the tort system after all of his appeals under 
the Program have been exhausted. The amount of money that a petitioner would be entitled to 
receive from the Program would vary depending on the severity of his injury, but the general 
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categories of injury-related expenses that would be covered are: medical expenses, lost wages, 
rehabilitation, and pain and suffering. 
2.  Administration and Funding  
Similar to the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, the Prescription Drug 
Injury  Compensation  Program  would  be  jointly  administered  by  the  Health  Resources  and 
Services Administration within the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department 
of Justice, and the Court of Federal Claims. The FDA would also play a very important role by 
creating  and  regularly  updating  the  list  of  drugs  that  are  covered  by  the  Program.  Initial 
compensation decisions under the Program would be made by special masters at the Court of 
Federal Claims, who serve the same function in the vaccine program. A petitioner who disagrees 
with the master’s decision would have the option to appeal that decision to the Court of Federal 
Claims, then to the Federal Circuit, and finally to the Supreme Court. 
The Program would be funded by a tax on covered prescription drugs. There are multiple 
ways to structure this tax. For one, rather than setting a flat tax rate for every pill that is sold, the 
Program could collect a percentage of the retail price of each drug. Therefore, the higher the 
retail price of a drug, the higher the tax on that drug. A more complicated way to structure the 
tax would be to collect higher taxes on drugs that cause more unforeseen adverse events, which 
are the drugs that cost the Program the most money. Of course, determining which drugs fall into 
this category is impossible ex ante, so the Program could start by setting tax rates on the basis of 
a pharmaceutical manufacturer’s market share.
153 Over time, the Program could “risk adjust” a 
manufacturer’s tax burden on the basis of the size of payouts to the users of its drugs, thereby 
encouraging manufacturers to improve the safety of their products.
154  
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3.  Demonstrating Causation in Fact 
One  of  the  most  difficult  aspects  of  establishing  the  Prescription  Drug  Injury 
Compensation Program would be setting a causation standard that allows Program administrators 
to identify legitimate claims without placing an impossible burden on petitioners. To streamline 
the causation inquiry undertaken by special masters at the Court of Federal Claims, the statute 
creating the Program should explicitly state that masters are bound to apply the Supreme Court’s 
Daubert framework to determine the reliability of scientific evidence. In addition, proceedings 
before a special master would function like a trial before a judge; evidence would be presented 
according to the Federal Rules of Evidence, and expert witnesses would be sequestered until they 
testify.
155  In  order  to  receive  compensation  from  the  Program,  a  petitioner  would  have  to 
demonstrate that it is more likely than not that a prescription drug caused the adverse event for 
which  she  is  seeking  compensation.  The  special  master  –  ideally  a  lawyer  with  significant 
training and experience in medicine or science – would make the initial determination of whether 
the petitioner satisfied the causation standard. Leaving this decision to the special master avoids 
the  problem  of  relying  on  lay  juries,  who  are  often  confused  by  expert  witnesses  and  have 
difficulty  understanding  the  complicated  scientific  theories  presented  at  trial.
156  Using  the 
Prescription  Drug  Injury  Compensation  Program  to  establish  a  framework  for  semi-formal 
adjudicative  proceedings  before  qualified  special  masters  would  ideally  ensure  more 
predictability and consistency than drug manufacturers currently receive from the tort system. 
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V. Conclusion 
  Congress should implement a no-fault compensation system, modeled after the National 
Vaccine  Injury  Compensation  Program,  which  will  award  money  to  patients  who  suffer 
unexpected  adverse  events  as  a  result  of  taking  a  prescription  drug.  Most  importantly,  this 
compensation system should preempt state-law failure-to-warn claims against prescription drug 
manufacturers.  Without  having  to  face  incredible  uncertainty  about  the  amount  of  damages 
awards or litigation expenses a drug will incur after it is sold to the public, pharmaceutical 
manufacturers would have greater incentives to invest in the development of new and innovative 
drugs that would greatly benefit patients. At the same time, patients who take a prescription drug 
and suffer a serious injury that was not foreseen by the drug’s manufacturer or the FDA will be 
compensated, so long as they can demonstrate that the drug was the cause of their injury. Society 
as a whole would benefit from the elimination of deadweight loss associated with failure-to-warn 
litigation, and the risk of unexpected injuries caused by prescription drugs would be efficiently 
spread  among  drug  manufacturers  and  patients.  Mounting  evidence  suggests  that  Congress 
should  implement  a  no-fault  compensation  system  to  replace  failure-to-warn  claims  against 
prescription  drug  manufacturers,  and  the  National  Vaccine  Injury  Compensation  Program 
provides an excellent model that can be adapted to meet the specific needs of participants in the 
market for prescription drugs. 